I am deeply invested in the development of Latin America; therefore, the launch of the Shield of the Americas this past March was a particularly compelling development. My initial takeaway is that the U.S. is aggressively reasserting itself as the sole hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, effectively maneuvering to sideline Chinese influence.
While the overarching geopolitics are clear, my primary focus remains on the initiative’s commitment to combating regional narcotrafficking—a goal I firmly support. In my earlier analysis, I nearly overlooked the trade-offs involved because of my focus on security, so it has been refreshing to see the nuances of how this movement is actually manifesting.
I believe this "Donroe Doctrine" will continue to prevail, largely because we are witnessing a "second swing" in Latin American political dynamics. Years ago, the region experienced the "Pink Tide" of leftist and socialist regimes. Today, the pendulum has swung back; major players like Argentina, Ecuador and El Salvador now have right-wing leaders who are closely aligned with the current U.S. administration. The notable exceptions to this trend are Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. However, with Colombia and Brazil both heading into pivotal elections this year, the regional landscape could shift even further. It will be fascinating to see if these remaining powers eventually fold into the Shield of the Americas movement or continue to hold out as bastions of regional autonomy.
Thanks for your comment! I agree that the reverse "pink tide" (perhaps it could be called and "orange tide" instead) likely means Shield of the Americas dynamics will continue into the future. My sense however is that the U.S. is overindexing on the security piece, and undervaluing the geostrategic element. The risk with that is the United States misses a window of opportunity in LAC to align the region more broadly when it comes to issues like competition with China.
This didn't make it into the piece, but I've been thinking a lot about Evan Feigenbaum's observation that the U.S. often acts like the "Hessians of Asia" - offering security and defense cooperation to its partners in the Indo-Pacific, but not really economic or development support. I worry we're running that same risk in the Americas where basically countries call up the United States to fight the cartels, but China's presence in regional economies and critical infrastructure remains largely untouched.
I am deeply invested in the development of Latin America; therefore, the launch of the Shield of the Americas this past March was a particularly compelling development. My initial takeaway is that the U.S. is aggressively reasserting itself as the sole hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, effectively maneuvering to sideline Chinese influence.
While the overarching geopolitics are clear, my primary focus remains on the initiative’s commitment to combating regional narcotrafficking—a goal I firmly support. In my earlier analysis, I nearly overlooked the trade-offs involved because of my focus on security, so it has been refreshing to see the nuances of how this movement is actually manifesting.
I believe this "Donroe Doctrine" will continue to prevail, largely because we are witnessing a "second swing" in Latin American political dynamics. Years ago, the region experienced the "Pink Tide" of leftist and socialist regimes. Today, the pendulum has swung back; major players like Argentina, Ecuador and El Salvador now have right-wing leaders who are closely aligned with the current U.S. administration. The notable exceptions to this trend are Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. However, with Colombia and Brazil both heading into pivotal elections this year, the regional landscape could shift even further. It will be fascinating to see if these remaining powers eventually fold into the Shield of the Americas movement or continue to hold out as bastions of regional autonomy.
Thanks for your comment! I agree that the reverse "pink tide" (perhaps it could be called and "orange tide" instead) likely means Shield of the Americas dynamics will continue into the future. My sense however is that the U.S. is overindexing on the security piece, and undervaluing the geostrategic element. The risk with that is the United States misses a window of opportunity in LAC to align the region more broadly when it comes to issues like competition with China.
This didn't make it into the piece, but I've been thinking a lot about Evan Feigenbaum's observation that the U.S. often acts like the "Hessians of Asia" - offering security and defense cooperation to its partners in the Indo-Pacific, but not really economic or development support. I worry we're running that same risk in the Americas where basically countries call up the United States to fight the cartels, but China's presence in regional economies and critical infrastructure remains largely untouched.