As a Brazilian, there are points I agree with and others I don't. I think the coverage of the history and future of Brazil's defense industrial base was well done! However, I have to disagree with the statement that "Latin American states by and large have managed their post-Cold War civil-military relations effectively"; that depends heavily on the specific country. I view Argentina, for instance, as the country facing the greatest difficulty in restoring social cohesion with the armed forces. Even though they held trials for military commanders after the dictatorship—unlike Brazil—these historical issues still affect public perception regarding the need for defense spending. Furthermore, because the region is (theoretically) the most peaceful in the world, there is no public sentiment to justify such investment. I would also raise another point: Latin America generally lacks political stability, which leads to the discontinuation of strategic projects whenever governments change. This discourages companies from investing in R&D, to the extent that armed forces programs are sometimes scrapped altogether. I think there is more to say, but this is getting too long.
Thanks for the comment! These are good points and I agree with you in many ways. I may have been too cavalier in my assessment of regional civil-military relations for the sake of brevity. My basic point was I think that public distrust of militaries in countries like Argentina is often misplaced, in fact from my conversations often military officials in Argentina deliberately refrain from commenting on national security matters where their expertise would be valued due to fears of it being construed as political. Low public support for increases in defense spending is a constant challenge in the Americas (including the US!) that would merit a whole post to address on its own. The political instability point is very interesting as well and one that affects a whole host of public policy issues including defense. It seems like a small number of regional champions like Embraer have been able to do relatively well navigating the pendulum swing of politics, but a lack of consistency in procurement is a big challenge nevertheless.
Sharp piece, Henry , and the Osório example does more work than it might first appear. The through-line from Engesa's collapse to Avibras's repeated near-death is, as you say, over-reliance on export demand to compensate for thin domestic orders. But it's worth noting how that same Brazil–Gulf axis is now running in reverse.
Where Engesa bet on a Middle Eastern order that never came, EDGE Group (UAE) is doing the opposite: rather than buying Brazilian, it's buying into Brazil's industrial base a 51% stake in Condor, half of SIATT, the MAX 1.2 already in service with the Army, new production in São José dos Campos. The Gulf demand Engesa waited for externally is now arriving as inward industrial investment.
As a Brazilian, there are points I agree with and others I don't. I think the coverage of the history and future of Brazil's defense industrial base was well done! However, I have to disagree with the statement that "Latin American states by and large have managed their post-Cold War civil-military relations effectively"; that depends heavily on the specific country. I view Argentina, for instance, as the country facing the greatest difficulty in restoring social cohesion with the armed forces. Even though they held trials for military commanders after the dictatorship—unlike Brazil—these historical issues still affect public perception regarding the need for defense spending. Furthermore, because the region is (theoretically) the most peaceful in the world, there is no public sentiment to justify such investment. I would also raise another point: Latin America generally lacks political stability, which leads to the discontinuation of strategic projects whenever governments change. This discourages companies from investing in R&D, to the extent that armed forces programs are sometimes scrapped altogether. I think there is more to say, but this is getting too long.
Thanks for the comment! These are good points and I agree with you in many ways. I may have been too cavalier in my assessment of regional civil-military relations for the sake of brevity. My basic point was I think that public distrust of militaries in countries like Argentina is often misplaced, in fact from my conversations often military officials in Argentina deliberately refrain from commenting on national security matters where their expertise would be valued due to fears of it being construed as political. Low public support for increases in defense spending is a constant challenge in the Americas (including the US!) that would merit a whole post to address on its own. The political instability point is very interesting as well and one that affects a whole host of public policy issues including defense. It seems like a small number of regional champions like Embraer have been able to do relatively well navigating the pendulum swing of politics, but a lack of consistency in procurement is a big challenge nevertheless.
Sharp piece, Henry , and the Osório example does more work than it might first appear. The through-line from Engesa's collapse to Avibras's repeated near-death is, as you say, over-reliance on export demand to compensate for thin domestic orders. But it's worth noting how that same Brazil–Gulf axis is now running in reverse.
Where Engesa bet on a Middle Eastern order that never came, EDGE Group (UAE) is doing the opposite: rather than buying Brazilian, it's buying into Brazil's industrial base a 51% stake in Condor, half of SIATT, the MAX 1.2 already in service with the Army, new production in São José dos Campos. The Gulf demand Engesa waited for externally is now arriving as inward industrial investment.